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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
Nos. 96-1495 and 96-1519 
 
AARON KAPLAN; JUDITH KAPLAN 
 
v. 
 
EXXON CORPORATION 
 
v. 
 
JAMES J. ANDERSON CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.; 
JAMES D. MORRISSEY, INC., 
       Third Party Defendants 
 
       Judith Kaplan and Aaron Kaplan, 
       Appellants at No. 96-1495 
 
       Exxon Corporation, 
       Appellant at No. 96-1519 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 95-cv-01942) 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 2, 1997 
 
Before: BECKER and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
and SCHWARZER, District Judge* 
 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________ 
*The Honorable William W Schwarzer, United States District Judge for 
the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 
 
 
 
ORDER AMENDING SLIP OPINION 
 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the slip opinion in the 
above case, filed September 25, 1997, be amended as 
follows: 
 
1. Page 10: Delete lines 6-11 and substitute the 
following in lieu thereof: 
 
       "snow mound. We believe that reasonable minds could 
       disagree whether Kaplan acted "under circumstances 
       that manifest[ed] a willingness to accept" the risk, 
       Berman, 542 A.2d at 5333, which means the issue 
       should go to the jury. Among the circumstances to 
       consider in evaluating the voluntariness of the 
       plaintiff's action is whether the plaintiff had a real 
       "choice." See Howell, 620 A.2d at 1112 ("The operative 
       fact is [the plaintiff's] voluntary choice to undertake 
       the risk."). The plaintiff does not make a real choice 
       when there is no safe alternative to encountering the 
       risk. Prosser and Keeton on Torts S 68 at 490-91 (W. 
       Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (no assumption of risk 
       where plaintiff has "no reasonable alternative.").5 The 
       district court" 
              
 
        5Of course, we can imagine situations where the 
       danger is known to the plaintiff and so obvious that a 
       court could say as a matter of law that the defendant 
       is not liable. See, e.g., Chiricos v. Forest Lakes Council 
       Boy Scouts, 391 Pa. Super. 491, 571 A.2d 474 (1990) 
       (plaintiff voluntarily stood in front of a moving, 
       trespassing vehicle to try to stop it); Kabo v. UAL, Inc., 
       762 F. Supp. 1190 (E.D.Pa. 1991) (sixty five year old 
       plaintiff/President of travel agency suffered heart 
       attack while lifting heavy baggage for tour group at 
       airport). 
 
2. Renumber all subsequent footnotes. 
 
       BY THE COURT, 
 
       /s/ Anthony J. Scirica 
 
         Circuit Judge 
 
                                2 
 
 
 
DATED: October 27, 1997 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
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